Enhancing coordination in water management through communication tools: results from experimental games in Coastal Bangladesh by Mitra, A. et al.
International Journal of the Commons




Copyright: content is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 License
ISSN: 1875-0281
Enhancing coordination in water management through 






International Water Management Institute, India
M.buisson@cgiar.org
Ram Bastakoti
International Water Management Institute, Nepal
r.bastakoti@cgiar.org
Abstract: Canal siltation is a pervasive problem in coastal Bangladesh causing 
water-logging and losses in crop yield. Although timely maintenance of canals 
through regular contributions from the community can solve this problem, it often 
breaks down because of the free riding issue, a common feature in the provision 
of public goods. Previous literature on experimental games has shown how differ-
ent communication strategies or leadership can help to achieve coordination. We 
conducted experimental games with the aims to: (i) determine the effectiveness 
of these different strategies in the specific problem of maintenance of canal; and 
(ii) compare the relative effectiveness of different communication mechanisms or 
leadership. Playing these games was also a part of a participatory action research 
approach with the idea that community members would have a clearer understand-
ing of the incentives and constraints of contribution for canal maintenance. The 
basic insight from our study is that any institution that enables more information 
sharing about both the intended contribution and setting the group norm translates 
into better coordination among the users to increase the group income towards 
Pareto Optimum outcomes. The lessons from these games could potentially open 
up a forum of discussion and help the villagers in their future communications as 
a tool for understanding and testing different alternatives for community manage-
Enhancing coordination in water management 775
ment of natural resources. The results are also of interest for development prac-
titioners supporting community organisations for sustaining local public goods.
Keywords: Coastal Bangladesh, communication, coordination, sequential thresh-
old public good, water management
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1. Introduction
Polders in the coastal zone of Bangladesh are low-lying areas surrounded by 
embankments. These embankments were constructed in the 1960s to avoid dam-
ages from floods and cyclones and intrusion of salinity. An elaborate network 
of canals and gates was constructed at the same time to regulate the inflow and 
outflow of water depending on irrigation and drainage requirements (Islam 2006; 
Brammer 2014). However, water management challenges in the polders stifle the 
potential of agricultural growth in the coastal region (Islam 2006; Dewan et al. 
2014).
Studies have shown that water-logging is a crucial problem in many parts of 
coastal Bangladesh resulting in damage of ‘aman’ rice during monsoon as well as 
delayed sowing of next dry-season crop (Moniruzzaman 2012; Awal 2014). The 
excessive water-logging is mainly due to siltation of canals and non-maintenance 
of the gates.
The maintenance of these water-related infrastructures play out like a clas-
sic public goods game. Canals and gates being public goods means anybody can 
get the benefits without contributing for their maintenance. Without any mainte-
nance, the situation of these infrastructures goes on worsening until it becomes so 
immensely expensive to repair that the local community can no longer repair them 
without external monetary help (government/donors). Regular maintenance and 
contributions (which can be in cash, kind or work) can be handled by the com-
munities but currently, this requirement breaks down because of the free riding 
issue (Tuong et al. 2014).
In this context, we designed a modified threshold public goods game, with 
the objective to identify how much communication and leadership can help in 
increasing community contributions and maintain the public good in the long term. 
To match to the real world issue of canal maintenance, we designed a dynamic 
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threshold public goods game (described later) and different forms of communica-
tion and leadership were introduced as treatments. Played as part of participatory 
action research, the second objective of the experimental games was to give an 
overall perspective of the situation to community members and a tool to try out 
innovative institutional solutions and evaluate their practicability.
The remainder of the article is organised as follows. The second section pres-
ents the design of the experimental game. In the third section, we discuss the 
theoretical equilibrium of the game. The fourth section presents and discusses the 
results for the indicators of interest. Section five presents further discussion about 
individual outcomes and learning effects. Finally, the sixth section concludes with 
the main learning from the experimental game.
2. Experimental design
Various studies have focused on assessing the effect of communication in achiev-
ing coordination in public goods game. Crawford (1998) gives an overview of 
both theoretical and experimental findings regarding the implication of commu-
nication via “cheap talk” in which the communication has no direct implication 
on payoffs. In his meta-analysis of impact of communication on social dilemmas, 
Balliet (2009) finds a largely positive effect of communication on cooperation, 
with a stronger effect in case of face-to-face discussion and large group commu-
nication. More recently, Palfrey et al. (2017) found that communication structures 
with unrestricted but anonymous text chatting through computer panels has the 
highest efficiency gains.
Compared to the numerous lab-based experiments studying the impact of com-
munication, there is relatively little field-based evidence of the efficacy of com-
munication in achieving coordination. Aflagah et al. (2015) used N–way (N=10, 
20) structured pre-play communication in a field setting in Senegal where players 
state how much they will contribute. Their results highlight that communication 
increases coordination only in large groups but they do not find significant results 
to indicate that communication has a stronger effect in case of a higher threshold 
or of uncertain and low outcome.
Along with communication, leadership can also play a key role in achiev-
ing coordination in public goods game. ‘Leader’ is here defined as the player 
who is the first mover i.e. the one who contributes first; while other players are 
the ‘followers’. There has been a growing literature in experimental econom-
ics looking at different ways in which leadership can affect outcome in public 
goods games through information signalling (Potters et al. 2007), leader’s abil-
ity to exclude followers (Guth et al. 2007) or leader’s social status (Kumru and 
Vesterlund 2010). Even in the simplest case of leadership without any asymmet-
ric information or additional powers, there is evidence of positive influence of 
leadership on overall contribution (Moxnes and Heijden 2003; Duffy et al. 2007; 
Jack and Recalde 2015). The ‘leader’ contributes more to set a good example 
and  trigger reciprocity from other players. In such cases, the first contributor 
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“leads by example”. However the literature also points to a tendency in which 
the followers try to undercut the leader’s contribution and free ride, which in 
turn may dampen the leader’s willingness to set a good example by committing 
first to contribute more (Haigner and Wakolbinger 2010; Rivas and Sutter 2011). 
The methods used to select the leader have also been studied and the results sug-
gest that average group contributions are higher when leaders are chosen endog-
enously from the group rather than when the leader is imposed (Haigner and 
Wakolbinger 2010; Rivas and Sutter 2011). The literature on threshold public 
goods games also suggests that sequential contribution achieves greater success 
rates compared to simultaneous contribution (Erev and Rapoport 1990; Coats 
et al. 2009).
In this context, it becomes interesting to compare leadership vis-à-vis commu-
nication in achieving better coordination in threshold public goods games. Here 
leadership is considered in its limited sense of setting a good example by the first 
mover and we will only be using an endogenous leadership design. Therefore, 
in this paper, we compare different communication and leadership treatments in 
achieving coordination in a dynamic threshold public goods game. In the thresh-
old public goods game a group of players must contribute from their endowments 
into some public fund. If the total contribution reaches a pre-determined threshold 
then all players receive a high payoff, otherwise everybody gets a low payoff. The 
literature has focused on a range of issues such as the effect of incomplete infor-
mation (Marks and Croson 1999), the heterogeneity of the players (Bagnoli and 
McKee 1991; Mysker et al. 1996), the effect of costs and benefits on voluntary 
provision of the public goods (Cadsby et al. 2008), and the effect of communi-
cation on contributions (Tavoni et al. 2011). In their meta-analysis of threshold 
public goods games, Croson and Marks (2000) revealed that in larger groups it is 
more difficult to coordinate; while coordination is easier with continuous contri-
bution than with dichotomous choice (all or nothing).
We designed a dynamic version of the standard threshold public goods game, 
by having two stages of the standard game. The aim of the design was to reflect 
the dynamic nature of canal maintenance. Anderies et al. (2013) have similarly 
used dynamically deteriorating irrigation canals in order to understand the nature 
of public provisioning of physical infrastructure in the face of asymmetric play-
ers and outcome uncertainty. We discuss our specific design in the section below.
2.1. Baseline game without any form of communication
In our baseline game, each participant was given e
1
 (10) tokens in each of two 
envelopes coloured blue and green. At the beginning of first stage, players needed 
to contribute simultaneously in a public pool from 10 tokens from their blue enve-
lope. Let c
i1
 be contribution of ith member in stage 1. If total contribution from 10 
members was greater than or equal to T
1
 (55) tokens, then each member received 
G
h1
 (20) tokens; otherwise if contributions fell short of T
1
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In the next stage players again had to contribute simultaneously in a com-
mon pool from e
2
 (10) tokens from the green envelope. If the total contribution 
from 10 members was greater than or equal to T
2
 tokens, then each member 
received G
h2









 were dependent 
on whether cooperation was achieved in the first stage or not. If coordination 





=10 (i.e. same as first stage). However, if cooperation was not achieved 
in the first stage, then T
2
=75 tokens and G
l2
=5. Here, the design aimed to repro-
duce the vicious cycle of maintenance with an increasing cost of reparation 
over time. The players were fully informed about these parameter values at the 
beginning of the first stage. 
Therefore, the payoff function of this two stage threshold public goods game 
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Our payoff function differs from the standard version in two major ways. 
Firstly, we have two stages and the parameters in the second stage are a function 
of whether or not the threshold was crossed in the first stage. If in the first stage 
the group fails to reach the threshold then in second stage the threshold becomes 
higher and the loss in not making the threshold in the second stage also becomes 
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larger. Secondly, we modify the payoff function to incorporate that if threshold is 
not met then players get a lower payoff and not zero. We designed the game in this 
way to reflect the reality of canal maintenance, where if maintenance is not done in 
initial years then in subsequent years it becomes very costly to renovate the canal. 
Also, the losses in agricultural outputs are likely to become higher when canals are 
not renovated and consequently irrigation as well as drainage become impossible. 
Moreover, in reality, even if coordination is not achieved farmers will still receive 
a positive payoff from using the canals and not a null payoff.
In our design, if a player does not contribute in the first round he is guaranteed 
to get 20 tokens. Instead, if he contributes 1 token he can get maximum 29 tokens 
in the first round. This incentive might seem low but the players’ contribution also 
affects the threshold level and the penalty in the second round. So irrespective of 
how much a player contributes, he is assured of 35 tokens in total (20 in first and 
15 in second round). However, if everybody contributes then on average a player 
can expect to get 49 tokens (5.5 tokens contributed in each round) and maximally 
he can get 58 tokens (with only 1 token contributed in each round). This design 
aims to capture the dynamic nature of players’ incentives.
We acknowledge that in real world situations, people differ according to their 
wealth, which may influence their ability and willingness to contribute. In addi-
tion, the benefit of a public good, like well-functioning canal, could be different 
for different people. However, for simplicity in the game we assumed homog-
enous players in terms of endowment and benefit function.
Along with this baseline control game, we played four other treatments that 
are described below. The choice of our treatments were based on preliminary 
qualitative field work on issues related to canal maintenance, governance and 
institutions as well as on literature review.
2.2. Leadership treatment
The role of leaders, commonly called influential people who can be large farmers, 
shrimp farmers, local government representatives or religious leaders is essen-
tial in the context of coastal Bangladesh. Their informal influence and behaviour 
can potentially have important impacts on the community members. As discussed 
before, there are many different reasons why one can expect leadership to foster 
better cooperation. However, in our design, we only consider leadership as the 
role of the first mover who sets good example. With the leadership treatment, we 
want to test the null hypothesis that initial contribution by a leader would posi-
tively motivate others to contribute and set up a norm for the group, which might 
help in achieving greater coordination. 
In this treatment, one player was chosen endogenously to contribute first, 
whose contribution was announced to the other nine players before they con-
tributed themselves. Then the rest of the group contributed simultaneously as 
in the other treatments. All other parameters remained similar to the baseline 
treatment. 
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The chosen player contributed first in both stages of the game. All the players 
knew who the leader was, how he was selected (randomly and/or endogenously) 
and how much s/he contributed. However, they did not know who else expressed 
interest to become leader and they did not know the contributions of the other 
nine players. However, except in one round out of 27 rounds of the leadership 
treatment, the leader was chosen endogenously. In four rounds, only one player 
wanted to be the first contributor and was therefore directly selected. In the rest 
more than one player expressed interest and the leader was randomly selected 
from them. 
2.3. Communication treatments
Three other treatments included different degrees of communication amongst 
the players. The contribution of players in the public goods game that we have 
used crucially depends on their beliefs about how much the other players will 
contribute. Allowing communication serves two purposes. Firstly, through com-
munication the players can negotiate among themselves and reach a consensus 
to set up a group norm. Secondly, communication refines the players’ beliefs 
about the possible contribution from others and helps in increasing the group 
income. 
These three communication treatments differ from the situation observed in 
most of the villages where communication on public issues is rarely institution-
alised. Even where a Water Users’ Group has been formed, regular meetings and 
open discussions among its members are often very limited. As a result, direct 
communication between the users of the canals about its maintenance and use is 
often non-existent. This makes it extremely difficult for the community to coor-
dinate in collecting contributions from users for regular maintenance of canals. 
Our assumption is that if communication is introduced, the risks associated with 
contribution can be reduced and coordination can be achieved. The three different 
communication treatments used are described below.
2.3.1. Structured communication
In the case of structured communication, at the beginning of each stage for 
each round players indicated their intended contribution by writing on a piece 
of paper. This information was then announced publicly but anonymously in a 
random order. The total amount of the intended contribution was also announced. 
Next, the players made actual contributions simultaneously and the parameters 
remained similar to the baseline game. In addition, the intended contribution was 
not binding i.e. the players were free to contribute as much as they want, indepen-
dently of what they announced. 
The idea of establishing the rules for communication before contributing was 
to reduce uncertainty about other players’ decisions and to help in establishing 
the norm of the group. In the real world, people do not interact through this kind 
of communication but the reason for studying it was to isolate the effect of basic 
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informational content about intended contribution versus other forms of commu-
nication with more scope of detailed discussion and persuasion.
2.3.2. Unstructured communication in large group
In the case of unstructured communication in large group, at the beginning of 
each stage for each round all 10 players had a face-to-face open discussion. The 
communication was completely unstructured and the only rule established by the 
facilitators was not to threaten anyone. The communication happened in front 
of the experimenters to ensure that no individual targeting and pressuring hap-
pened. After this discussion, the game was played with the same parameters as 
in the baseline game. To allow the players to have a free and open discussion, 
records were not taken. One point to note here is that the communication that 
happened was informal and there was no binding agreement amongst players. 
The actual contributions were still anonymous and simultaneously decided as 
in the baseline game. So nobody could know what other players have actually 
contributed.
By introducing this unstructured communication treatment, we expected to 
trigger non-pecuniary effects on players’ decisions. There are two primary differ-
ences between structured communication and unstructured communication. First, 
in structured communication, the focus was entirely on the intended contribution 
with no scope for discussion, whereas in unstructured communication players had 
the ability to convince others, to explain and discuss. The second difference is that 
in structured communication the intended contributions were anonymous while in 
unstructured communication there was a scope for people to know who intended 
to contribute how much.
2.3.3. Unstructured communication in small group
Unstructured communication in small group is exactly the same as that in 
large group as described above, the only difference being that during com-
munication, the players were divided into groups of five people each and the 
two groups did not communicate amongst themselves. However, the threshold 
amount that needed to be crossed still depended on the total contribution of all 
10 players. Similar to the large group treatment here also, the communication 
was completely unstructured and all other parameters of the game remained 
the same. With this treatment, the idea was to compare small group commu-
nication vis-à-vis large group communication. One assumption is that if in 
large groups a consensus is difficult to reach, it might become easier in smaller 
groups. However, in smaller groups there is also less information received by 
each player.
The primary objective of looking at unstructured communication both in large 
and small groups was to compare the real world situation where everybody is 
involved in the communication versus the situation where communication only 
happens in smaller groups without any communication ever happening between 
these different groups. Large groups are for example akin to Water Management 
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Associations with farmers from different villages, while smaller groups are akin 
to Water Management Groups with farmers from one village or even with plots 
neighbouring one sluice gate.
2.4. Study area, sample size and implementation
The experimental games were conducted in five villages from high and inter-
mediate levels of salinity zones from Satkhira and Khulna districts in coastal 
Bangladesh. The villages were selected based on secondary data and preliminary 
field visits. In all five selected villages canal siltation has been reported as one of 
the main problems even if the degree of siltation, the consequences and the role 
of the communities differ.
In each village, we played with two groups of 10 players each. We had World 
Fish as our research partner in Bangladesh who were working in these villages for 
a long time. We asked them to select a more or less representative sample from 
farmers in each village. Some of the players were from groups involved in par-
ticipatory action research for improved livelihoods and others were from the rest 
of the village community. In addition, we ensured the representation of women in 
the groups and villagers with different economic and social background as well to 
have a representative sample of players. However all our participants were from 
agricultural households and hence dependent on canals for irrigation and drainage 
purposes.
The games started with a short introduction and then a detailed description. 
Four treatments were played with each group and the explanation of each treat-
ment was given sequentially before playing that treatment.1 Adequate time was 
spent after the explanations to answer the questions of the participants so that 
everybody understood the rules and objective of the game. After completion of 
the games, we conducted a short survey to collect basic information about the 
demographic characteristics, wealth and social capital of the players.
The games were conducted in a neutral language for research purposes and 
were not linked to the actual problem of canal maintenance. This differs from 
field experiments usually conducted in which the game is clearly contextualised 
and in which players’ actions might be dictated by what ought to be done. Our 
players were actual farmers from the community where these infrastructure main-
tenance issues are very real. This is a unique feature of our game. However, after 
the games were played, open discussion sessions were conducted with all the 
players to contextualise the games, get feedback from the players and identify 
potential lessons in achieving coordination for improved management of their 
water infrastructures.
Combining the baseline and the treatments previously described, we had five 
different treatments which can be denoted as follows:
1 The detailed instructions given to the players are available upon request.
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•	 Baseline/Control game (A)
•	 Structured communication (B) 
•	 Leadership (C)
•	 Unstructured communication in large group (D)
•	 Unstructured communication in small group (E)
We played with 10 groups and a total of 100 players. Each group played four 
treatments only (including the baseline game) and each treatment was repeated 
three times. Thus, for each group, 12 repetitions were played. While designing the 
combination of treatments we decided that since treatment D and treatment E are 
very similar they would not be played by the same group. We therefore had two 
combinations either ABCD or ABCE. To achieve a relatively balanced sample for 
each of our treatments, these two combinations were equally divided among our 
10 groups, i.e. each combination was played by 5 groups.
After finalising the combination of treatments, it was ensured that the order in 
which the treatments are played be different in each group. The purpose of doing 
this was to ensure that the learning effect does not bias the effect of a particu-
lar treatment. Indeed, the player’s decisions may be dependent on which round 
the treatment is being played, as the player learns through repeated playing so 
it becomes important to change the sequence of treatments for different groups. 
Ultimately, we had two groups starting with game A, two groups starting with 
game B and so on. Given this restriction, a particular sequence of treatment for 
the group was chosen randomly. Table 1 gives our final sample.
All the games were done in complete information and common knowledge 
framework i.e. the entire game was explained openly at the beginning of the game 
with all parameters being announced. The players also knew beforehand that there 
would be three rounds for each of the treatments. They were also informed that 
real payments will be made at the end of the game and that after the three rounds 
of each treatment, one repetition out of the three will be randomly selected for 
deciding the value of the actual payments. The total contribution was reported 
Table 1: Sample size by treatments.a
Treatments Total 
repetitions
Total no. of 
individual decisions
Baseline/Control game (A) 31 310
Structured communication (B) 27 270
Leadership (C) 27 270
Unstructured communication in a large group (D) 15 150
Unstructured communication in small group (E) 15 150
Total 115 1150
aIn one village due to some logistical reasons, we had only 3 treatments, with baseline played 4 times.
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after each stage of the game but the individual value of the contribution remained 
anonymous.
Each participant was paid BDT2 30 as showup fee. Any additional income 
depended on the outcome of the games. The total income earned by the players 
was BDT 163 on average, with the maximum and minimum incomes being BDT 
210 and BDT 100, respectively. Given that the players were engaged for three 
hours approximately, the average earning of the players was commensurate with 
average daily agricultural rate for men in the month of November, which was 
BDT 270 (Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics 2013).
3. Equilibria analysis
Before analysing the results of our experiments, it is necessary to discuss the 
possible equilibria of our game, as it is against this benchmark that we inter-
pret results. Croson and Marks (2000) analysed the one stage threshold public 
goods game with no refund and homogenous players. It has two sets of equi-
libria – first is the inefficient Nash equilibrium in which nobody contributes 
and the minimum threshold amount or “cost of the public good” is not met, 
and second is the set of efficient Nash equilibrium where the total contribution 
exactly equals the minimum threshold amount. Our baseline game differs from 
this one stage threshold public goods game in two ways: firstly there are two 
stages of threshold public goods game with no refund and secondly the param-
eters in the second stage are dependent on the outcomes of the first stage. So it 
becomes necessary to study the sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium of this two 
stage threshold public goods game. We restrict our analysis to pure strategy 
equilibria.
3.1. Baseline game
In order to discuss the sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium of our game, we start 
with the second stage of baseline game. In the second stage, the baseline game is 
exactly the same as the one stage threshold public goods game with no refund. So 
as discussed before it has two Nash equilibrium solutions: either nobody contrib-
utes or else total contribution exactly equals the minimum threshold amount or 
“cost”. Indeed, if nobody contributes then no individual player has the incentive 
or ability to supplement the pool and reach the threshold amount. Alternatively, if 
total contribution is exactly equal to the minimum threshold amount then, how-
ever unequal the individual contributions are, no player has incentive to reduce 
his contribution; indeed, such action would not increase his private income by 
more than what he loses in income from public good provision. One point to note 
is that given the parameters in our games (threshold amount either 55 or 75 and 10 
2 1 USD=77.40 BDT when the game was conducted, in November 2014.
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players), this set of Pareto efficient equilibria is an asymmetric pure strategy Nash 
equilibrium, with unequal contribution from players. There exists no symmetric 
pure strategy equilibrium, in this set of Pareto efficient equilibrium.
There is no other equilibrium. If total contribution exceeds minimum thresh-
old then at least one player can increase his private consumption without affecting 
public good provision. If total contribution is less than threshold amount, then 
either some player has both the ability and incentive to increase contribution in 
public pool or there is at least one player who does not have ability to supplement 
the public pool and hence has incentive to reduce his contribution to zero. These 
two sets of equilibria in the second stage is irrespective of which node the game 
is at, i.e. threshold is 55 or 75.
In first stage of the game, players have threshold 55, but their contribution 
decides what will be threshold at next stage. Here also there are two Nash equi-
libria: either nobody contributes or else total contribution exactly equals the mini-
mum threshold of 55 tokens. The reasons are the same as before. 
So, in our baseline game, the sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium alternatives 
are (i) no contribution in both first stage and in second stage (ii) no contribution 
in first stage and total contribution exactly equals 75 tokens in second stage, (iii) 
in first stage total contribution exactly equals 55 tokens and in second stage total 
contribution is zero (iv) contribution exactly equals 55 tokens in the first stage and 
55 tokens in the second stage.
3.2. Leadership treatment
Let us consider the leadership game in its second stage with threshold set at 
T (55 or 75) tokens. Let us consider the leader has contributed L (0<=L<=10) 
tokens. For the nine players who are followers they contribute simultaneously. 
For them the threshold is T-L. This game is the same as our original baseline 
game. So possible Nash equilibrium are that all nine players contribute zero 
(T-L>e=10) or total contribution of nine players is exactly equal to T-L. The 
reasoning is the same as before.
For each possible contribution by leader L (0–10), i.e. for each of the final 
nodes of the sequential game, there are multiple equilibria. Choosing any par-
ticular strategy profile for the nine followers or choosing one Nash equilibrium 
in each of these final sub-games, we have to find the leader’s optimum action. 
The leader’s optimum contribution is the minimum L say L
0
, at which the Nash 
equilibrium is T-L
0
 rather than zero. If at all nodes, Nash equilibrium is zero con-
tribution by all nine players then leader will also contribute zero. This is one 
sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium. If at L
0
, Nash equilibrium of nine followers is 
T-L
0
 and for all L<L
0
, Nash equilibrium is zero contribution from all nine players, 
then leader’s optimum is L
0
. This is SPNE. So even in this leadership game, all 
possible sub-game perfect Nash equilibria are reached i.e. the leader contributes 
zero, and all nine followers contribute zero; or leader contributes L
0
 and all nine 
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3.3. Communication treatments
In structured communication treatment and unstructured communication treat-
ment (with both large group and small group), the parameters remain the same as 
in baseline game. The only difference is that in each stage of the game, players 
communicate amongst themselves in a non-binding way. This does not affect the 
equilibrium in any way and the Nash equilibrium of our game does not differ from 
the baseline game.
The set of pure strategy Nash equilibria in each of the treatments is similar to 
the one from the baseline game. Our interest is to find out to what extent groups 
can achieve the Pareto efficient set of Nash equilibria under different treatments.
4. Results
We look at three group variables to measure the effectiveness of any treatment in 
achieving coordination: the success rate in crossing the threshold and ensuring 
public good provision; the average contribution of players; and finally how much 
the group income falls short of the maximum income that they could have earned, 
i.e. deviation from the optimum income. Since our public goods game has two 
stages with varying thresholds, we analyse stage 1 and stage 2 separately along 
with looking at the two stages together. Moreover, in stage 2, the threshold level 
could be either 55 tokens or 75 tokens, depending on the success in the first stage; 
therefore, in our analysis we differentiate between these two cases in stage 2. As 
robustness checks, we finally analyse the individual income and test the impact 
of the learning effect.
4.1. Public good provision across treatments
First, we consider the provision of the public good or the success rate across the 
treatments in stage 1 and 2 (Figure 1). The rate of success in crossing the thresh-
old of 55 tokens in stage 1 is the lowest in the baseline games (61%) and the 
highest in large groups with unstructured communication (87%). If the leadership 
treatment is ignored, then we note that the rate of success gradually increases with 
communication. This first result confirms our assumption. Interestingly the lead-
ership treatment is also extremely successful in achieving public good provision 
in spite of its limited scope of communication, since 85% of the rounds played 
with this treatment crossed the threshold and delivered the public good in stage 
1. Pairwise t-tests of different treatments vis-à-vis baseline confirms that in stage 
1, apart from the small group communication treatment, all the three other treat-
ments reach a significantly (at less than 1%) higher success rate than the baseline 
game.
If public good was provided in stage 1, the success rate of stage 2 is very high, 
above 80% across all treatments. However, pairwise t-tests identify no significant 
differences between the different treatments and the baseline game. This overall 
high success rate, irrespective of the level of communication between the players, 
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means that if in stage 1 the group successfully reaches the threshold then they do 
not change their contribution in stage 2. This result highlights that when a group 
experiences success in the delivery of a public good, members keep reproducing 
the same behaviour to receive the same benefits again. This initial success sets the 
norm and initiates a virtuous circle. This point will also be clear when we explore 
the pattern of individual contribution.
On the contrary, if the public good was not provided in stage 1, and threshold 
has increased to 75 tokens then we observe a dramatic decrease in the success 
rate in stage 2. On average, considering all the treatments, the average success 
rate in stage 2 when stage 1 failed, is 18%. This is the opposite scenario; the 
inability of the group to succeed in the first stage makes the success in the sec-
ond stage very unlikely. This situation is akin to a vicious circle and reproduces 
the actual maintenance issue, when the repeated lack of maintenance makes 
community engagement to solve the issue less and less likely. This situation 
arises because of the cost, which gets more and more expensive over time due to 
deferred maintenance.
Only the treatments with small group unstructured communication and large 
group unstructured communication achieve slightly higher success rate in stage 
2 when the stage 1 was not successful, respectively 40% and 50%; for these two 
treatments the success rates is also significantly higher than in baseline games. In 
leadership treatments, none of the games was successful and in structured com-
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Figure 1: Proportion of games in which public good provided.
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We can therefore consider that open communication, and especially in larger 
groups can be an effective tool to move out of the vicious circle of the deferred 
maintenance and to achieve successful coordination of the community again; even 
if the probability of success remains far lower than the one achieved in groups not 
experiencing failure. However, in this situation when the mistrust is established 
among the group members, the structured communication is not effective; indeed 
the players do not believe that the contributions announced by others will effec-
tively be pooled. Similarly, the role of a leader is unavailing under this scenario; 
none of them has been able to re-establish trust and cooperation.
4.2. Average contribution of players across treatments
Next, we analyse the average contribution of the players across different treat-
ments. As shown in Table 2, in stage 1, the average contribution is above 5.5 
tokens for all the treatments.3 T-tests establish that there is no significant differ-
ence across the treatments and between the treatment and baseline game in the 
first stage. The same holds true with the contributions of the second stage if the 
public good was provided in stage 1. The level of contributions between stage 1 
and stage 2 when the stage one was successful are also very similar.
However, if the public good was not provided in stage 1, then in the sec-
ond stage, the threshold level was 75 and we note a sharp increase in the indi-
vidual contribution in that case. In Table 2 comparing the cases where public 
good was provided in stage 1 vis-à-vis the case where public good was not 
provided in stage 1, we note that for all the treatments the average contribu-
tion in stage 2 is significantly higher when the public good was not provided 
in the first stage. 
This is confirmed by analysing how the contributions evolve from stage 1 
to stage 2. In Table 3, the change in contribution is defined as the difference 
between individual contribution in stage 2 and the individual contribution in stage 
3 Since the threshold is 55 tokens and we had a group of 10 players, we consider that on average, 
each player had to contribute a minimum of 5.5 tokens (5 or 6) to cross the threshold.
Table 2: Average contribution of players by treatments.
Stage 1 Stage 2 if public 
good provided in 
Stage 1
Stage 2 if public 
good not provided 
in Stage 1
Baseline/Control game 5.69 5.95 6.65
Leadership 5.93 5.97 6.88
Unstructured communication in small group 5.57 5.85 7.36
Structured communication 5.77 6.01 6.74
Unstructured communication in a large group 5.75 5.7 8.05





). When the public good was provided in the first stage, on average players 





=0 cannot be rejected. This confirms the virtuous circle established 
in case of success, the willingness of the players to maintain their contributions to 
achieve the success again and the fact that communication tools are not essential 
under those conditions. On the contrary, when they failed to reach the threshold in 
stage 1, players increase their contribution significantly in the second stage. The 
difference between the contribution in stage 1 and 2 is highly significant for all 
the treatments. This is in the case of treatments with unstructured communication 
that the difference is the largest; in those cases, the players allocate 2 to 3 tokens 
more to the pool than they did in the first stage. These results mean that players 
take into consideration the challenge of reaching a higher threshold and increase 
their individual contribution to make the game successful.
Yet, in spite of the increase in the level of contribution from stage 1 to stage 2 
when the stage 1 failed, we previously saw that this is not enough to make most 
of these games successful and to reach the required threshold. Indeed, except 
for large group unstructured communication treatment, the average of individual 
contribution is lower than 7.5 tokens4 (Table 2). In this case, with unstructured 
communication in large group treatment, the average individual contribution is 
significantly higher than in the baseline games (Table 2).
Results revealed that the unstructured communication among the entire group 
of players is the only treatment that has been able to re-establish coordination in 
the groups who experienced failure.
Similar patterns are observed when we analyse the percentage of players who 
contributed in each stage of the game more than 5.5 or 7.5 tokens depending on 
whether the threshold is 55 tokens or 75 tokens respectively (Table 4). If the pub-
lic good was not provided in stage 1 then in stage 2, most of the players step back 
and decide not to allocate to the pool the minimal number of tokens that would be 
required from each player for the group to reach the threshold. In those cases, the 
4 Since the threshold is 75 tokens in this situation and we had a group of 10 players, we consider that 
on average, each player had to contribute a minimum of 7.5 tokens (7 or 8) to cross the threshold.





] Public good 
provided in stage 1
Public good not 
provided in stage 1
Baseline/Control game –0.06 1.46***
Leadership –0.09 1.7***
Unstructured communication in small group (5) 0.00 2.34***
Structured communication 0.11 1.56***
Unstructured communication in a large group (10) –0.10 2.65***
Note: ***Significantly different from zero at 1%.
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players do not think that they will get any returns from the group; they therefore 
decide to prefer their individual interest against the uncertain social interest. It 
is only with unstructured communication treatments that the majority of players 
allocate the minimum level of contribution which gives a chance to the group to 
succeed. For example, in stage 2 when stage 1 failed and with unstructured com-
munication in large group, 65% of the players contributed 7.5 or more tokens 
while they were only 40% likely to do so in baseline and leadership treatments. 
The percentage is also higher in stage 2 with no provision of the public good in 
stage 1 (65%) than in stage 1 (62%) or in stage 2 with provision of the public good 
(58%). This result confirms that when the challenge is important and the risk to 
fail in the vicious circle of deferred maintenance is high, only communication 
with all the stakeholders has a chance to achieve the delivery of the public good.
4.3. Deviation from optimum group income
Finally, we look at the income earned by the group under various treatments. 
Mann-Whitney tests of these group level parameters across different treatments 
(adjusted for multiple comparisons) showed that the group income is significantly 
higher only in the case of unstructured communication in large group as compared 
to the control game.
In Figure 2, we analyse the percentage of deviation between the actual income 
reached by the group and the optimum group income, i.e. the maximum income 
that could have been earned by the group as a whole for each game. 
With this design of the game, the step return function is greater than 1, the 
group always gets back more than what it invests at the threshold amount; but 
investing more than the threshold amount will not increase the return to the group. 
Therefore, the optimum income for the group is when the group contribution is 
exactly at the threshold level. The optimum group income in any stage of our 
game is calculated as: I
opt
=200+(100 – threshold). Consequently, in stage 1, the 
optimum group income is 245 tokens. As the group contributes 55 tokens, it is 
left with 45 tokens and it gets back 200 tokens (20×10), making the total 245 
tokens. In stage 2, if the threshold level is 55, then optimum income is 245 tokens 
and if the threshold is 75, then the optimum income is 225. If we combine stage 
Table 4: Percentage of players whose contribution crossed the individual average amount 
needed to reach the group threshold.
Stage 1 threshold 
55 tokens
Stage 2 threshold 
55 tokens
Stage 2 threshold 
75 tokens
Baseline/Control game 57.1 62.6 40.0
Leadership 63.3 64.8 40.0
Unstructured communication in small group 62.0 67.0 60.0
Structured communication 58.5 61.4 48.0
Unstructured communication in a large group 62.0 58.5 65.0
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1 and stage 2, then the optimum income is achieved when public contribution in 
both stages is exactly equal to 55 tokens, which makes the total maximum group 
income as 490 tokens.
In stage 2 across all the five treatments, we find that the deviation from the 
optimum income increases hugely compared to stage 1 if the public good was 
not provided in stage 1. Indeed the deviation is, respectively, at 5% and 52% 
in stage 2 when the stage 1 was successful and not successful. In this case, the 
threshold increases to 75 tokens and as a result, people increase their contribution 
but coordination become very difficult to achieve. This results in an important 
deviation from the optimum income. Yet with unstructured communication (both 
in large group and small group), this deviation is the lowest. For example, with 
unstructured communication in large group, the group loses 36% of the maximum 
income, which could have been earned whereas it was as high as 64% in the case 
of the leadership treatment.
In addition, the deviation from the optimum income is lower in stage 2 when 
the public good was provided in stage 1 as compared to stage 1. On average in 
stage 1, the group income is 11% less than the optimal income, but in the second 
stage with provision of the public good in stage 1 it is 5%. This result reinforces 
the idea of the virtuous circle previously mentioned. Not only are the players 
 easily able to reproduce a success and to deliver the public good again if they 
already experienced it, but in addition they increase their income as a group to 
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Figure 2: Percentage deviation from optimum group income in each stage across treatments.
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It should be noted that in stage 1 or in stage 2 with success in stage 1, there 
are no significant differences in the level of deviation from the optimum income 
across the different treatments. This means that improved communication through 
specific tools is not necessarily needed in a group who already coordinated suc-
cessfully in the past, and in that case individual simultaneous decisions without 
communication will not perform worse than with communication. 
Finally, combining all the cases together, we identify a gradient in the devia-
tion from the optimum income that matches with the degree of communication. 
With unstructured communication in large groups before deciding the individual 
level of contribution, the actual income earned is 9% lower than the optimum 
income whereas it is more than 21% when contributions are decided without any 
preceding communication among the players. Overall, this highlights the essential 
role of communication to reach higher benefits both from individual and social 
perspectives.
5. Discussion
5.1.  Individual incomes
Analysing the group level parameters, we demonstrate the role of a vicious or 
virtuous circle in the provision of public goods in a dynamic threshold design 
and the positive impact of unstructured communication as compared to the other 
treatments in the achievement of coordination. However, with group level param-
eters, we have only 115 observations for comparing five treatments. With this 
limited sample size, power may be insufficient to detect additional differences 
between the treatments. We therefore analyse the total income for each individual 
(Table 5).
We find that leadership, structured communication, and unstructured com-
munication in large group are all significantly different from control game at 1%. 
This confirms the results established from the analysis of the group parameters. 
However, we could not find significant difference amongst these four treatments.
Table 5: Total individual income from both stages of the game.
Mean income1 Standard deviation
Baseline/Control game (N=310) 38.6a 12.1
Leadership (N=270) 43.5b 9.5
Unstructured communication in small group (N=150) 41.7a,b 10.4
Structured communication (N=270) 43.3b 9.5
Unstructured communication in a large group (N=150) 44.6b 7.7
Total (N=1150) 42.0 10.4
Note: 1Based on multiple Mann-Whitney tests, accounting for family-wise error; diverging superscript 
letters between any two treatments indicate difference in mean income is statistically significant at 0.01 
level, while if any two treatment have a common superscript letter then they do not have any statistically 
significant difference.
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We also ran a simple regression model with individual income as the depen-
dent variable and different treatments as dummy variables to capture how individ-
ual incomes differ under different treatments. An Ordinary Least Square (OLS) 
regression with variances clustered at the group level is presented in Table 6.5
All four treatments have a positive impact on the individual income as com-
pared to the control game, which is omitted variable here. In coherence with the 
previous results, the highest coefficient is for unstructured communication in 
large groups (significant at less than 5%), followed by structured communication 
and unstructured communication which are both significant at 10%.
5.2. Tests on learning effect
In our design, to ensure that learning effects do not bias our results we randomised 
the sequence in which the treatments were played. To test that this is actually not 
the case, in Table 7 Col 1, Spearman rank correlation coefficients are presented 
between player’s contribution and the round in which it is played (from 1 to 12). 
In column 2, the correlation is given between players’ contribution and the game 
sequence in which it was played (from 1 to 4 – this is the sequence of a particu-
lar treatment amongst the 4 treatments that each group played). No significant 
correlations are identified and the correlation coefficients are close to zero. This 
confirms that the game design selected avoids the contamination of results with 
learning effects bias.
5.3. Post-game discussions and policy implications
At the end of the day, facilitators invited all the players from the village to  discuss 
their experience/learnings from the games and to think about the similarities 
and implications this could have in their water related issues. The relationship 
5 The individual income being censored within range of 10–60 tokens, so we also ran the same 
 regression using a Tobit model. The results are consistent and available upon request.
Table 6: Regression analysis: individual income and treatments.
OLS Individual income
Leadership 4.762 (3.000)
Unstructured communication in small group 3.115* (1.618)
Structured communication 5.077* (2.424)
Unstructured communication in a large group 6.140** (2.159)
N 1150
R2 0.1851
Note: Group id constants, total number of rounds already played, total number of treatments already 
played and constant included as control variables. *Significantly different from 0 at 10%, **at 5%, ***at 
1%. Robust standard errors are in brackets.
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of this game with the canal maintenance issue was discussed. Most players said 
that playing the game and then thinking and discussing about it later they have 
understood better why community contributions for canal maintenance often 
fails and how open communication can help in achieving coordination.
Many players were clear on the main results and mentioned that institutions 
should be set up to facilitate regular and open communication among community 
members and beneficiaries of the water infrastructures. They consider that this 
type of institution does not exist so far. They also recognised that although com-
munication with all the stakeholders is the most effective tool, in a context of 
important socio-economic heterogeneity, it is unlikely that community members 
can endogenously organise themselves and start such an initiative. Players men-
tioned that a third party, who can, for example, be local government actors, should 
initiate the process and bring the people together.
6. Conclusion
In this paper, we have used a sequential version of the threshold public goods 
game, where there are two stages of the game and action in the first stage deter-
mines the threshold level in the second stage. This game was designed to stylise 
the public good problem faced every day by the people of coastal Bangladesh in 
managing the water infrastructures in the polders. Water infrastructures in the vil-
lage require regular maintenance. If this maintenance is not done regularly then 
over the years, the situation worsens and the small damage becomes bigger and 
costlier until the repairs become beyond the capacity of community members. 
In that case, external help is required but livelihoods are damaged in the mean-
time. To avoid this situation, communities need to organise themselves and initi-
ate coordination to contribute for regular maintenance. However, in reality, this 
coordination is rare and in this paper, we have tried to examine how different 
mechanisms can help in achieving improved coordination.
Table 7: Correlation between player’s contribution and sequence of the game.




















Note: The coefficients presented are Spearman’s Rank correlation coefficients. p-values are in italic.
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Along with the basic game defined in the baseline, we played four other varia-
tions: a leadership treatment in which one of the players contributes first and his 
contribution is known to all, a treatment with structured communication in which 
players indicated anonymously and without binding how much they would like to 
contribute before actual contribution, a treatment with unstructured communica-
tion in which players openly talk among themselves before their actual contribu-
tion in small (five) or large groups (ten).
As already described in the literature, the analysis from the games confirms that 
in the first stage of the game when the degree of communication increases, the suc-
cess rate of coordination (crossing the threshold) increases. In the literature, all of 
these treatments show a positive effect on the coordination but we make a relative 
comparison amongst them and show that unstructured or open communication has 
the largest positive impact on achieving coordination and higher income. Beyond 
this, the novelty of the results concerns the dynamic nature of our design of the 
threshold public goods game played in a field setting outside the lab. We establish 
that if in stage 1 success is achieved, then in stage 2 players do not change their con-
tribution and there is almost no difference across treatments. However, the crucial 
importance of communication comes out in stage 2 if in stage 1 the public good 
was not provided; in this case, the threshold is higher and coordination is even more 
difficult. Players increase their average contribution but it is not enough to cross the 
threshold. Under this scenario, open communication among all the members per-
forms the best in achieving coordination and increasing group income.
Another positive result from this game is that when communities experience 
success and receive the benefits from public good provision, a virtuous circle is 
started and there are good chances that the positive behaviours will be reproduced 
in the subsequent periods. This means that there is no perpetual trap and that 
communities can initiate sustainable and responsible practices for regular mainte-
nance of their water infrastructures.
The results from this experimental game compared to the reality of the canal 
maintenance issue provide arguments for establishing institutions able to initiate 
open communication in large groups of stakeholders with the support of external 
actors.
Finally, a number of important questions remain which need to be further 
analysed to tie more closely the theory and the uptake of the research. We noted 
that larger groups reach higher success rates in the delivery of the public good but 
we wonder if a turning point exists and if communication becomes inefficient in 
very large groups. Also, we showed a virtuous circle when the players experience 
success in the first stage of the game. What the results would be in games with 
more than two periods is unknown. 
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